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This paper discusses banking competition and leader-follower relationship. Banking competition is 
investigated using some specification from Monti-Klein model that allows leader-follower (i.e. Stackleberg) 
relationship, the possibility of Cournot competition and other form of competition. We use monthly 
observations across 119 banks listed in Indonesia using the standard panel fixed effect methodology 
to absorb time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and dynamic panel data to minimize the risks of 
endogeneity. The estimation suggests the leader-follower relationship among banks exist both on loan and 
deposit markets. The results are mostly consistent across different groups and on full sample estimates, 
although are quite different in magnitudes. While leader-follower relationship is dominantly occur in 
credit market, there are some evidence of simultaneous appearance of both leader-follower and Cournot 
interactions on the deposit market.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Our preliminary investigation indicates that the response of deposit interest rate and lending rate 
towards monetary policy in Indonesia has been asymmetric. The response of deposit rate has 
been relatively proportional and timely, whereas the response of lending rate has been lagging 
and relatively rigid. This could be an indication of uncompetitive market (Cottarelli dan Kourelis, 
1994; Borio and Fritz, 1995). Moreover, responses towards monetary policy among group of 
banks with different assets are heterogenous. Therefore, it indicates that some behavior related 
to individual market power and interaction among banks affect the industry response. 
Those problems, which related to competition behavior in banking industry, are likely to 
affect the monetary policy transmission, particularly through interest rate channel and lending 
channel. Further, competition is also a relevant factor to increase efficiency (Hafidz dan Astuti, 
2013) and to determine interest rates (Muljawan et. al. 2014). 
Previous literatures conduct empirical estimates on this issue by applying widely-used 
competition indicators such as Lerner Index (Amidu and Wolfe, 2013), Hirchman-Herfindahl 
Index (Adams and Amel, 2011), Panzar and Rosse H-Statistic (Gunji et. al, 2007; Oliviero et. 
al., 2011) and Boone Indicator (van Leuvensteijn, 2013). This method, particularly by using 
Lerner, Boone Indicator or H-Statistic can indicate “conduct and performance” effect, whereas 
HHI only capture market structure effect. However, those approaches are generally explains 
competition on the whole industry, and does not capture asymmetrical interactions among 
individual banks. 
Ariefianto (2009) suggest estimating specification that derived from Monti-Klein model 
that allows possible indication of leader-follower or Cournot interactions. This model is originally 
based on Cournot interactions (see Klein, 1971; Frexias and Rochet, 2008). In addition, Toolsema-
Veldman and Schoonbeek (1999) had derived a Stackleberg version of this model. However, 
Ariefianto (2009) estimates are based on arbitrary choice of samples. 
This research will examine competition in banking industry using industrial organization 
approach, also by improving methods to determine sample selection. Further, this research will 
model interest rate setting on a bank towards monetary policy using game theory and analyze 
the implications on monetary policy transmissions. Particularly, this research tries to answer 
three questions; first, how is the competition behavior on Indonesian banking industry? Second, 
if the leader(s) exist, how the followers will respond to leader’s decisions? Third, how does the 
bank competition indirectly affect monetary policy transmissions? 
This research is aim to contribute a more interactive indication about competition behavior 
on banking industry. In addition, this research potentially indicates a recommendation to 
increase the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. We limit the analysis on the case 
of Indonesia. 
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II. THEORY
Bank competition is essential to be discussed. Competition between banks tends to raise 
efficiency (Hafidz and Astuti, 2013). Empirically, the degree of competition is one of determining 
factors of interest rate (Muljawan et. al. 2014). Moreover, a more concentrated banking industry 
has more rigid interest rate movement (Hannan and Berger, 1991; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992). 
However, Adams and Amel, (2011) said that the relationship between banking competition 
and monetary policy response are ambiguous. 
Previous empirical studies conduct estimates on this issue by applying a widely-used 
competition indicators such as Lerner Index (Amidu and Wolfe, 2013), Hirchman-Herfindahl 
Index (Adams and Amel, 2011) and Panzar and Rosse H-Statistic (Gunji et. al, 2007; Oliviero 
et. al., 2011). This method, particularly by using Lerner or H-Statistic can indicate “conduct 
and performance” effect, whereas HHI only capture market structure effect. However, 
those approaches generally provide insights on the industry as a whole, and cannot capture 
asymmetrical interactions among individual banks. 
Ariefianto (2009) suggest estimating specification that derived from Monti-Klein model 
that allows possible indication of leader-follower relationship or Cournot interactions. This 
model is originally based on Cournot interactions (see Klein, 1971; Frexias and Rochet, 2008). 
In addition, Toolsema-Veldman and Schoonbeek (1999) had derived a Stackleberg version of 
this model. 
We recall a form of Monti-Klein model, by noting the following assumptions: 
1. Two bank products, deposit and credit, are homogenous. Bank 1 and bank 2 have linier 
function of deposit and credit demand: 
rL = α - βL ; L= L1 + L2
2. Banks using deposit and credit quantities as strategic instrument 
3. Linier cost function: 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
rD = a + bD ; D = D1 + D2
C1 (L1, D1) = γL,1L1 + γD,1D1
C2 (L2, D2) = γL,2L2 + γD,2D2
4. Interbank money market rate (r) is exogenous variable as it affected by monetary policy of 
Bank Indonesia. 
24 Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 19, Nomor 1, Juli 2016
5. Profit function of bank: 
�i = rLLi - rDDi - r(Li - Di) - Ci(Li, Di)
Combining equations (1) to (5) above, obtained maximization utility function of bank: 
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
First partial differentiation of (6) to lending and credit variable derives equation (7) and 
(8) as follows: 
Li = L
P-
α - r - γL,i
2β
1
2
L-i-
1
2
Di = D
P-
r - a + γD,i
2b
1
2
D-i-
1
2
Equation (7) and (8) show that the quantity of credit (deposit) of a bank is affected inversely 
by that the quantity of credit (deposit) of the leader and those of other competitor. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Empirical Specification 
For the first analysis, we use a general specification that allows leader-follower (i.e. Stackleberg) 
relationship, the possibility of Cournot competition and other form of Competition, as in 
Ariefianto (2009). 
From (7) and (8), we have basic understanding that one bank’s lending (deposit) depends 
on its leader and other bank’s lending (deposit). Combining (7) and (8) with macroeconomics and 
banking variables, where , the general specification can be represent as follows: 
Xit = α + β1X
p
t + β2X-i,t + ΣkγkYkt + ΣmμmZmit + uit
X
it
 is the amount of loan (deposit) of a particular bank i at t, Xp
t
 is the amount of loan 
(deposit) supplied by the leader, X
-i,t
 is the amount of loan (deposit) supplied by the rest of 
followers, Yk
t
 is the kth panel-invariant factor, zm
it
 is the mth panel-variant factor, and u
it
 is the 
stochastic error. a is a constant. 
25Competition and Leader-Follower Interactions: Panel Estimates on Indonesian Banking
The possible key hypotheses on Equation (9) are as follows: 1. If b1 < 0 and b2 < 0, it 
indicates that the leader and other competitor are significant to affect bank’s quantity of credit/
deposit; 2. If b1 < 0 and b2 = 0, then the market is indicated to be consistent to leaderfollower 
relationship (i.e. Stackleberg competition). 3. If b2 < 0, b1 = 0, then the market is indicated to 
be consistent with Cournot model, or it can be inferred that there is no leader exist. 4. If b1 > 
0 and/or b2 > 0 , it may indicate other form of competition that is not usually predicted. 
Control variables, the “panel variant” or “panel invariant” factors consists of 
macroeconomic variables (GDP, inflation, exchange rates, and benchmark interest rates), specific 
internal bank variables (non-performing loans, capital adequacy ratio, etc), and industry variables 
(HHI). This list of control variables are partly based on Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Angellini 
dan Certorelli (2003). Further details of these variables are reported on the appendix. 
We use two approaches to estimate Equation (9), namely: 1. the standard panel fixed 
effect methodology to absorb time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (by replacing a with ai 
); 2. dynamic panel data as in Arellano-Bond (1991) to minimize the risks of endogeneity (by 
replacing a with X
it-1). 
3.2. Grouping of Observations 
Observations consist of monthly data of 119 banks listed in Indonesia. The main data source 
are Bank Indonesia and CEIC. Observations are grouped based on an identification of whether 
banks compete on a relevant market, where the products across banks have a high degree 
of interchangeability. This step is crucial as competition is the central issue in this paper. To 
facilitate this matter, on estimations on credit market we use degree of similarity on credit across 
economic sectors between each bank and the leader candidate, using the following formula: 
(10)Xi = -
xik
Σk xik
K
k
Σ xIkΣk xIk
x
ik
 is bank i’s lending on sector k, and x
Ik
 is bank leader’s lending on the corresponding 
sector. This formula was modified and inversed from trade complementary index (Michaely, 
1996), which is used generally in international trade analysis. The leader candidates are Bank 
A, Bank B, Bank C, Bank D, and Bank E. 
Similarly, for estimations on deposits, we use degree of similarity on deposit spatially 
(i.e. individual bank’s deposit distribution across provinces) between each bank and its leader 
candidate, using following representation: 
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x
im
 is bank i’s deposits on province m, and x
Im
 is the leader’s quantity of deposits on the 
corresponding province. 
Each group estimates applies to a group of observations that consists of 30 banks with 
the lowest value of Xi. As we have 5 suspected leaders (Bank A, B, C, D, E), then we have 5 
groups (Group A, B, C, D, E, respectively) to estimate. In addition, we conduct estimation using 
all observations as a robustness test for omitted variable bias regarding omitted competitors 
across groups. To note, for full-sample estimations, we define the quantity of leaders’ deposit/
credit is the sum of those of all leader candidates. 
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1. Credit Market 
The results of fixed effect panel regression (Table IV.1-1) shows that four groups of banks, 
each with Bank A, Bank B, Bank D, and Bank E as the leader respectively, follow Stackleberg 
competition, without any indication of Cournot competition. The highest follower response 
to the leader’s choice of credit quantity is indicated on the group of banks with Bank B as the 
leader (i.e. Group B). Moreover, GDP have positive impact to dependent variables with elasticity 
close to unity. Non-performing loan (NPL) has negative impact to bank lending. 
Xi = -
xim
Σk xim
M
m
Σ xImΣk xIm (11)
Table 1.
Fixed Effect Panel Estimation for Credit
Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E
VARIABLES  
Leader Credit  
 
Follower Credit  
 
CONTROL 
VARIABLES  
1. Macroeconomics  
2. Structural  
3. Internal bank  
Constant  
 
Observations  
R-squared  
Number of bank  
Hausman Prob  
GDP, inflation rate, interbank rate,  exchange rate  
HHI, credit diversification, credit  to PDB ratio  
NP L, CAR, BOPO  
-0.0189**
(0.00799)
0.0961
(0.204)
-4.483***
(1.107)
420
0.902
12
0.008
-0.0557**
(0.0232)
0.0209
(0.168)
-3.426*
(1.601)
525
0.862
15
0.099
-0.0107
(0.0307)
-0.110
(0.253)
-4.104***
(1.236)
525
0.914
15
0.093
-0.0175*
(0.00923)
0.215
(0.285)
-3.940***
(1.196)
525
0.900
15
-0.0292*
(0.0148)
0.375
(0.345)
-3.360
(3.170)
525
0.720
15
0.000
Dependent variable: Log (Credit)  (…) = Robust standard errors  
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Dynamic panel data for credit indicates a leader-follower relationship for all groups 
estimated, and also consistent for full-sample estimates, that contain all banks in the 
industry. 
Bank C and Bank B groups follows Stackleberg and Cournot competition model 
simultaneously. The highest response to the leader’s decision is indicated on the group of banks 
with Bank D as the leader. GDP have positive impact with short term elasticity 0.14 – 0.30. 
Interbank money market rate and NPL variables are negative, tends to be inelastic. The lag 
dependent parameters are estimated below unity, thus indicate dynamic stability. 
4.2. Deposit Market 
The fixed effect panel data regression shows that a leader-follower relationship occurs in all 
groups of observations, except for the groups of observations with Bank C and Bank A as the 
leader, respectively. Cournot competition model applies for all groups, except for the group 
of banks with Bank A as the leader. The highest follower response to the leader’s decision 
occurs on the group of banks with Bank D as the leader. GDP have positive impact to quantity 
of deposit with elasticity that close to unity, especially in groups of banks with Bank C, Bank 
A, and Bank D the leader, respectively. Non-performing loan (NPL) has a negative impact to 
bank’s deposit amount. 
Table 2.
Dynamic Panel Estimation for Credit
Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Full Sample
VARIABLES  
Leader Credit  
 
Follower Credit  
 
CONTROL 
VARIABLES  
1. Macroeconomics  
2. Structural  
3. Internal bank  
Constant  
 
Observations  
Number of bank  
Sargan test prob  
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) prob  
GDP, inflation rate, inter-bank rate, exchange rate  
HHI, credit diversification , credit to PDB  ratio  
NPL, CAR,  BOPO  
-0.0638**
(0.0263)
-0.0084
(0.0414)
0.983***
(0.00495)
913
27
0.331
0.967
-0.0585***
(0.0184)
-0.122**
(0.0521)
0.997***
(0.00595)
945
27
0.278
0.762
-0.0447**
(0.0197)
-0.167***
(0.0419)
0.992***
(0.0102)
945
27
0.212
0.393
-0.134**
(0.0680)
-0.0834
(0.0942)
0.983***
(0.00611)
832
26
0.267
0.105
-0.0247**
(0.0108)
-0.0422
(0.0541)
0.970***
(0.0105)
840
24
0.514
0.413
-0.208*
(0.121)
0.163
(0.138)
0.965***
(0.00647)
3,521
105
0.898
0.110
Dependent variable: Log(Credit)  (…) = Robust standard errors  
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In general, dynamic panel regression indicates that Stackleberg and Cournot competition 
models apply simultaneously for all group estimates and full-sample estimates. 
The highest response occurs on the group of banks with Bank D as the leader (i.e. Group 
D), where 10% increase on Bank D’s deposit will be responded by, on average, 3.6% decrease 
Table 3
Fixed Effect Panel Estimation for Deposit
Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E
VARIABLES  
Leader deposits  
 
Follower deposits  
 
CONTROL 
VARIABLES  
1. Macroeconomics  
2. Structural  
3. Internal bank  
Constant  
 
Observations  
R-squared  
Number of bank  
Hausman Prob.  
GDP, inflation rate, interbank rate,  exchange rate  
HHI, credit diversification, credit  to PDB ratio  
NPL, CAR, BOPO  
-0.106
(0.138)
-0.607
(0.426)
17.76**
(6.755)
391
0.430
12
0.000
-0.122**
(0.0421)
-0.887**
(0.316)
14.50***
(3.571)
408
0.558
12
-0.0968
(0.103)
-0.831*
(0.390)
8.653***
(2.630)
408
0.493
12
-0.359**
(0.127)
-1.893***
(0.562)
23.26***
(3.152)
380
0.526
12
-0.166**
(0.0639)
-0.974*
(0.461)
4.441
(7.023)
403
0.271
14
0.029
Dependent variable: Log(Deposits)  (…) = Robust standard errors  
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.
Dynamic Panel Estimation for Bank’s Deposit
Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Full Sample
VARIABLES  
Leader deposits  
 
Follower deposits  
 
CONTROL 
VARIABLES  
1. Macroeconomics  
2. Structural  
3. Internal bank  
Lag dependent  
 
Observations  
Number of bank  
Sargan Test Prob
Arellano Bond 
AR(2) prob  
GDP, inflation rate, interbank k rate, exchange rate  
HHI, credit  diversification,  credit to PDB  ratio  
NPL, CA R,  BOPO
-0.466***
(0.0541)
-0.231***
(0.0860)
0.989***
(0.00834)
798
25
0.228
0.512
-0.269***
(0.0419)
-0.165*
(0.0851)
0.991***
(0.00797)
822
25
0.202
0.632
-0.185***
(0.0455)
-0.370***
(0.116)
0.992***
(0.00968)
774
25
0.363
0.733
-0.298***
(0.0711)
-0.256***
(0.0900)
0.999***
(0.0122)
846
25
0.181
0.515
-0.209***
(0.0402)
-0.777***
(0.170)
0.937***
(0.0250)
754
26
0.569
0.394
-0.471***
(0.128)
-0.339***
(0.0582)
0.988***
(0.0171)
3,212
106
0.147
0.429
Dependent variable: Log (deposits) (…) = Robust standard errors  
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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on follower’s deposit. GDP have positive impact to deposit variables. Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index (HHI) has negative impact with small effect. Lag dependent coefficients below 1 indicates 
dynamic stability of the model. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The estimation results suggest a leader and follower relationship among banks on most of the 
grouped observations, although with some variations in magnitude. Generally, competition 
between followers is insignificant on credit market, but is significant on deposit market. Leader 
and follower competition result can be viewed on Table 3 below. Control variables, such as: 
GDP, inflation rate, interbank rate, exchange rate, HHI, credit diversification, credit to PDB ratio, 
and operational bank ratios are generally show consistent parameters as expected. All-sample 
estimates also suggesting similar results, and hence confirming the robustness of selected-
sample regressions. For estimates using dynamic panel regressions, all estimations fulfill dynamic 
stability and well represent the data variations. Moreover, the estimations met the exogeneity 
assumptions for instrumental variables. 
Table 5.
Group Summary
Fixed Effect
Arellano-Bond
Arellano-Bond
Competition
Highest Response
Competition
Highest Response
Competition
Stackleberg,
Except Group C
Group B
Stackleberg with Cournot
for Group C and Group B
Group D and Group B
Stackleberg
Stackleberg and Cournot,
Except Group C and Group A
Group D
Stackleberg and Cournot
Group D
Stackleberg and Cournot 
simultaneously
Panel Data Lending Deposit
Although our results indicate that leader-follower relationship is generally hold on both 
credit and deposit market, either in separate groups or full sample, this paper still put restrictive 
assumptions on the leaders’ behavior. The interactive responses between leaders have yet to 
be analyzed without any prior restrictions. The suggestion for further research is to improve 
the empirical specification. For instance, to use credit/deposit similarities as a weight matrix 
that attached to the leader-follower coefficients to allow multiple leaders at once as well as to 
allow heterogeneous response towards each leader’s decisions. 
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APPENDIx
Table 1.
List and Notes of Dataset
Main Variables  
Credit  
Deposit  
Credit/deposit of the leader  
Credit/deposit of the followers  
Macroeconomics 
GDP
   
Inflasi   
Interest rate   
Exchange rates  
Industry   
HHI 
  
Credit to GDP ratio   
Internal Bank   
NPL   
CAR   
BOPO   
Credit to asset ratio   
 
Bank Indonesia  
Bank Indonesia  
Bank Indonesia  
Bank Indonesia, authors’
calculation.  
 
CEIC
   
CEIC   
CEIC, Bank Indonesia
CEIC  
  
Bank Indonesia, authors’
calculation.  
Authors’ calculation  
 
Bank Indonesia  
Bank Indonesia  
Bank Indonesia  
Bank Indonesia, 
authors’ calculation
 
Total credit of individual bank data  
Total deposit of individual bank data  
5 banks as candidate (Bank A, B, C, D, E)  
Industry data – data on a particular bank observed 
 
Nominal, interpolated to monthly using quadratic
match sum  
Year-on-year terms  
Interbank call money  
 
 
Using credit/deposit approach
  
As a proxy to indicate the industry 
significance on the economy  
 
Share of credit with quality 3 to 5  
 
Operational cost / revenues  
As a proxy to indicate business diversification  
Variables Source Notes
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Table 2.
Fixed Effect Estimates on Credit Market
VARIABLES  
Kredit leader  
 
Kredit follower  
 
Variabel kontrol  
1. Makroekonomi  
PDB  
 
Inflasi  
 
Suku bunga PUAB  
 
Real Exchange Rate  
  
2. Struktural  
HHI  
 
Diversifikasi  
  
Rasio kredit/PDB  
  
3. Internal bank  
NPL  
  
CAR  
  
BOPO  
 
Constant  
 
Observations  
R-squared  
Number of bank  
-0.0189**
(0.00799)
0.0961
(0.204)
1.041***
(0.236)
-0.000251
(0.00135)
-0.00530
(0.00556)
-0.182*
(0.0836)
-0.000474
(0.000411)
-0.199***
(0.0459)
0.0694***
(0.0180)
-0.0197**
(0.00648)
-9.92e-05***
(1.31e-05)
1.91e-05
(0.000271)
-4.483***
(1.107)
420
0.902
12
-0.0557**
(0.0232)
0.0209
(0.168)
1.124***
(0.208)
-0.00365
(0.00298)
-0.00556
(0.0113)
-0.355***
(0.0730)
0.000980
(0.000663)
-0.238***
(0.0688)
0.0685***
(0.0209)
-0.0288***
(0.00416)
0.000721
(0.00162)
0.000229
(0.000165)
-3.435*
(1.795)
525
0.862
15
-0.0107
(0.0307)
-0.110
(0.253)
1.185***
(0.230)
-0.000910
(0.00200)
-0.0127*
(0.00652)
-0.214***
(0.0575)
0.00102**
(0.000437)
-0.125***
(0.0324)
0.107***
(0.0190)
-0.00764
(0.00826)
-0.00197
(0.00362)
0.000250**
(9.83e-05)
-4.104***
(1.236)
525
0.914
15
-0.0175*
(0.00923)
0.215
(0.285)
0.908***
(0.280)
0.000500
(0.00164)
-0.0116
(0.00935)
-0.211
(0.131)
-8.79e-05
(0.000573)
-0.148***
(0.0454)
0.0661***
(0.0150)
-0.0280***
(0.00151)
-0.00249
(0.00376)
0.000244
(0.000200)
-3.940***
(1.196)
525
0.900
15
-0.0292*
(0.0148)
0.375
(0.345)
0.933***
(0.199)
0.000488
(0.00417)
-0.00582
(0.0231)
-0.250**
(0.105)
-0.00108
(0.000646)
-0.0771
(0.0813)
0.144*
(0.0695)
-0.0248**
(0.00956)
-0.00345
(0.00669)
-0.000663
(0.000514)
-5.745
(4.673)
525
0.720
15
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Table 3.
Dynamic Panel Estimates on Credit Market
Variabel  
Kredit leader  
 
Kredit follower  
 
Variabel kontrol  
1. Makroekonomi  
PDB  
 
Inflasi  
 
Suku bunga PUAB  
 
Exchange Rate  
  
2. Struktural  
HHI  
 
Rasio kredit/PDB  
 
Diversifikasi  
  
3. Internal bank  
BOPO  
 
NPL  
 
CAR  
 
Lag dependen  
  
Observations  
Number of bank
-0.0638**
(0.0263)
0.00843
(0.0414)
0.131**
(0.0545)
0.00279*
(0.00148)
-0.0157**
(0.00643)
-0.111
(0.0698)
-0.000484*
(0.000280)
0.00409*
(0.00241)
-0.0131
(0.0111)
-0.000100
(0.000197)
-0.00170
(0.00128)
-0.0007***
(0.000243)
0.983***
(0.00495)
913
27
-0.0585***
(0.0184)
-0.122**
(0.0521)
0.205***
(0.0632)
0.000804
(0.000889)
-0.0155***
(0.00449)
-0.142***
(0.0492)
0.00055***
(0.000202)
0.000956
(0.00156)
0.00464
(0.00459)
5.70e-05
(0.000125)
-0.00558***
(0.00157)
0.00113**
(0.000526)
0.997***
(0.00595)
945
27
-0.0447**
(0.0197)
-0.167***
(0.0419)
0.305***
(0.0545)
0.00250***
(0.000825)
-0.0236***
(0.00513)
-0.251***
(0.0541)
-5.84e-06
(0.000188)
0.00460
(0.00402)
-8.21e-05
(0.00584)
-0.000195
(0.000152)
-0.0064***
(0.00208)
0.000980
(0.000717)
0.992***
(0.0102)
945
27
-0.134**
(0.0680)
-0.0834
(0.0942)
0.189***
(0.0487)
-0.000652
(0.000915)
-0.0176***
(0.00474)
-0.0198
(0.0486)
0.00075***
(0.000211)
0.00719***
(0.00222)
0.0120***
(0.00380)
-0.000186
(0.000155)
-0.0070***
(0.00139)
-6.58e-05
(8.72e-05)
0.983***
(0.00611)
832
26
-0.0247**
(0.0108)
-0.0422
(0.0541)
0.144**
(0.0731)
0.00178
(0.00163)
-0.0178**
(0.00759)
-0.115
(0.0812)
-0.000501
(0.000321)
0.00609
(0.00457)
0.0174***
(0.00496)
5.03e-05
(0.000154)
-0.00219
(0.00379)
-0.000149
(0.000722)
0.970***
(0.0105)
840
24
-0.609*
(0.314)
0.642*
(0.365)
0.0970
(0.0847)
-0.000783
(0.00165)
-0.0109*
(0.00640)
0.0374
(0.0473)
0.00104**
(0.000522)
0.00516**
(0.00248)
-0.00155
(0.00350)
-2.89e-05
(0.000102)
0.00305
(0.00643)
-0.00086***
(0.000310)
0.986***
(0.00939)
3,319
105
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Table 4.
Fixed Effect Estimates on Deposit Market
VARIABLES  
DPK leader  
 
DPK follower  
 
Variabel kontrol  
1. Makroekonomi  
PDB  
 
Inflasi  
 
Suku bunga PUAB  
 
Exchange Rate  
  
2. Struktural  
HHI  
 
Diversifikasi  
  
Rasio kredit/PDB  
  
3. Internal bank  
NPL  
  
CAR  
  
BOPO  
 
Constant  
 
Observations  
R-squared  
Number of bank  
-0.106
(0.138)
-0.607
(0.426)
0.222
(0.336)
-0.0365***
(0.0107)
0.179**
(0.0788)
0.0575
(0.235)
-0.00513**
(0.00166)
0.124***
(0.0307)
0.164***
(0.0395)
-0.000784
(0.0246)
0.00509***
(0.000583)
0.000440
(0.000889)
17.76**
(6.755)
391
0.430
12
-0.122**
(0.0421)
-0.887**
(0.316)
1.078***
(0.301)
-0.00629**
(0.00277)
0.0574***
(0.0140)
-0.489**
(0.158)
-0.00624***
(0.00118)
0.215***
(0.0443)
0.121***
(0.0273)
0.00186
(0.0141)
-0.0159***
(0.00454)
4.76e-05
(0.000387)
14.50***
(3.571)
408
0.558
12
-0.0968
(0.103)
-0.831*
(0.390)
1.575***
(0.429)
-0.0103
(0.00690)
0.0312
(0.0207)
-0.749***
(0.228)
-0.00669***
(0.00170)
0.0191
(0.0610)
0.105***
(0.0331)
-0.0185
(0.0172)
-0.0187***
(0.00414)
0.000648
(0.000605)
8.653***
(2.630)
408
0.493
12
-0.359**
(0.127)
-1.893***
(0.562)
1.580**
(0.628)
-0.0170***
(0.00314)
0.128***
(0.0154)
-0.491**
(0.204)
-0.00620***
(0.00127)
0.0762***
(0.0216)
0.165***
(0.0367)
0.0156
(0.0154)
-0.000991
(0.000869)
0.000629
(0.000538)
23.26***
(3.152)
380
0.526
12
-0.166**
(0.0639)
-0.974*
(0.461)
2.199***
(0.523)
-0.0121*
(0.00569)
-0.00557
(0.0331)
-0.855*
(0.443)
-0.0150***
(0.00437)
0.0228***
(0.00370)
0.418
(0.270)
0.00430
(0.0314)
-0.0111**
(0.00386)
-4.96e-05
(0.000194)
4.441
(7.023)
403
0.271
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Table 5.
Dynamic Panel Estimates on Deposit Market
VARIABLES  
DPK leader  
 
DPK follower  
 
Variabel kontrol  
1. Makroekonomi  
PDB  
 
Inflasi  
 
Suku bunga PUAB  
 
Exchange Rate  
  
2. Struktural  
HHI  
 
Rasio kredit/PDB  
 
Diversifikasi  
  
3. Internal bank  
BOPO  
 
NPL  
 
CAR  
 
Lag dependen  
  
Observations  
Number of bank  
-0.466***
(0.0541)
-0.231***
(0.0860)
0.857***
(0.0963)
0.00259
(0.00269)
0.0161**
(0.00799)
-0.0597
(0.0856)
-0.00352***
(0.000461)
0.00301
(0.00209)
-0.0137***
(0.00519)
0.000596
(0.000379)
-0.00265
(0.00261)
0.000204
(0.000298)
0.989***
(0.00834)
798
25
-0.269***
(0.0419)
-0.165*
(0.0851)
0.394***
(0.114)
0.00409*
(0.00240)
0.0328***
(0.0110)
0.419***
(0.123)
-0.00266***
(0.000462)
0.00318
(0.00253)
-0.00451
(0.00768)
0.000765**
(0.000366)
-0.00428***
(0.00158)
0.000230
(0.000292)
0.991***
(0.00797)
822
25
-0.185***
(0.0455)
-0.370***
(0.116)
0.643***
(0.153)
0.00252
(0.00231)
0.0149*
(0.00837)
-0.0256
(0.0966)
-0.00206***
(0.000495)
0.00245
(0.00234)
0.00949*
(0.00516)
0.000229
(0.000344)
-0.00225
(0.00150)
-0.000343
(0.000355)
0.992***
(0.00968)
774
25
-0.298***
(0.0711)
-0.256***
(0.0900)
0.652***
(0.156)
0.00539**
(0.00262)
-0.0178
(0.0109)
-0.205*
(0.119)
-0.000923
(0.000591)
0.00505
(0.00532)
0.0133
(0.0124)
0.000398
(0.000506)
-0.00583
(0.00532)
-0.000152
(0.000396)
0.999***
(0.0122)
846
25
-0.209***
(0.0402)
-0.777***
(0.170)
0.903***
(0.188)
-0.00336
(0.00609)
0.0602**
(0.0236)
0.351*
(0.196)
-0.00369***
(0.00118)
0.0763**
(0.0344)
-0.00125
(0.00194)
0.000542*
(0.000327)
-0.0161
(0.0129)
-0.000823
(0.00117)
0.937***
(0.0250)
754
26
-0.471***
(0.128)
-0.339***
(0.0582)
0.776***
(0.218)
-0.00392
(0.00315)
0.0380**
(0.0190)
0.240
(0.169)
-0.000771
(0.00114)
0.00844
(0.00541)
-0.00322**
(0.00154)
0.00101*
(0.000590)
0.0109
(0.00853)
0.00778***
(0.000680)
0.988***
(0.0171)
3,212
106
Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E Full Sample
37Competition and Leader-Follower Interactions: Panel Estimates on Indonesian Banking
Graph 1. Credit Market: Dynamic Panel Actual Vs. Fitted Values
Graph 2. Deposit Market: Dynamic Panel Actual Vs. Fitted Values
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